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Abstract—Many password alternatives for web authentication proposed
over the years, despite having different designs and objectives, all
predominantly rely on the knowledge of some secret. This motivates
us, herein, to provide the first detailed exploration of the integration
of a fundamentally different element of defense into the design of web
authentication schemes: a mimicry-resistance dimension. We analyze
web authentication mechanisms with respect to new usability and
security properties related to mimicry-resistance (augmenting the UDS
framework), and in particular evaluate invisible techniques (those re-
quiring neither user actions, nor awareness) that provide some mimicry-
resistance (unlike those relying solely on static secrets), including device
fingerprinting schemes, PUFs (physically unclonable functions), and a
subset of Internet geolocation mechanisms.
1 Introduction
None of the many schemes proposed over the years to replace
password-based web authentication have offered sufficient
usability and deployability benefits to displace passwords at
the Internet scale [1]. Since passwords do not seem to be
disappearing [2], a prominent avenue of improvement is to
reinforce their security by parallel mechanisms [3] without
further burdening users.
A challenge in providing sufficient security guarantees
for web authentication, i.e., user-to-web and device-to-web
(versus user-to-device), is that the security of many schemes,
including those relying on something-you-have or something-
you-are, requires the ability to protect a secret. For example,
a physical biometric such as a fingerprint can be captured
in transit and replayed by an attacker without possession
of the physical fingerprint, resulting in security properties
similar to other stored secrets such as passwords. The reliance
of many schemes on an element of secrecy is reflected in
the Usability-Deployability-Security (UDS) evaluation frame-
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work [1], where eight of nine security properties assess a
scheme’s resilience against the exposure of a secret.
We revisit the process of compromising an account from an
attacker’s perspective, now viewing it as a two-stage process
involving both exposure and mimicry. Exposure refers to the
capture of information that enables account access, such as
a password, session cookie, or a cryptographic key; mimicry
refers to actions performed by the attacker to impersonate the
legitimate user’s behavior or associated characteristics, such
as replaying a password or spoofing a user’s geographic loca-
tion (i.e., in location-based authentication [4]). Accordingly,
a scheme’s authentication token may resist attacks by both:
resisting exposure and resisting mimicry.
The term mimicry has been used previously in the context
of intrusion detection systems, referring to the attacker’s
ability to mimic legitimate traffic [5]. In contrast, the mimicry-
resistance dimension has been relatively little-studied in
the context of web authentication. We therefore investigate
mimicry-resistance in web authentication herein and system-
atize elements not previously addressed in the literature. We
first define a suitable set of criteria and then rank schemes
across a continuum of three classes of resistance to mimicry,
as detailed in Section 3. Mimicry-resistance has been explored
within the context of user-to-device authentication; for exam-
ple, Khan et al. [6] analyze mimicry attacks on user-to-device
authentication schemes that rely on behavioural biometrics,
such as touchscreen finger movement patterns. In contrast,
herein we analyze web authentication schemes; our analysis
finds that most of these schemes offer little to no resistance to
mimicry.
To construct a more comprehensive evaluation framework
for authentication schemes, we augment the existing UDS
security properties, which concentrate on exposure-resistance,
with new properties measuring mimicry-resistance. We lever-
age the UDS framework security properties to systematically
rate authentication schemes across an additional continuum
ranging from lowest to highest resistance to exposure, and
use these as orthogonal axes (exposure and mimicry) to plot a
two-dimensional chart. Along both dimensions, our evaluation
also reflects the scalability of attacks required to defeat a
scheme.
The lack of mimicry-resistant schemes among those pre-
viously evaluated under UDS [1] motivates us to select and
evaluate a representative set of techniques for reinforcing
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2web authentication that demonstrate the benefits of mimicry
resistance. Our constructed framework dissects various de-
grees of mimicry resistance, and helps analyze currently
known methodologies that may provide some degree of re-
sistance to mimicry attacks. We then evaluate techniques
that fall under four approaches, namely device fingerprint-
ing (FP) [7], Internet geolocation [8], Physically Unclonable
Functions (PUFs) [9], and One Time Passwords (OTPs) [10];
some variations of these offer resistance to mimicry attacks,
and/or are also invisible, in that they do not require any
user effort to configure or use (see Section 2). We supplement
the UDS framework with two usability properties and four
security properties (Table 3). Under this revised framework,
we evaluate techniques which fall under the four aforemen-
tioned approaches when combined with passwords, and find
that invisible and mimicry-resistant schemes combined with
passwords provide significantly higher resistance to attack.
This constitutes an initial step towards identifying mimicry-
resistant web authentication schemes that can enhance secu-
rity with minimal usability penalties.
In summary, the following contributions are made:
• Investigating the mimicry-resistance dimension in web
authentication, including ranking schemes under three
sub-classes of mimicry resistance.
• Exploring newer invisible techniques, and evaluating
their degree of mimicry resistance when used for web
authentication.
• Constructing a comprehensive evaluation framework,
which includes (a) a two-dimensional chart combining the
exposure and mimicry resistance dimensions, to visually
reflect the ability of a scheme to resist scalable attacks;
(b) an augmented UDS framework.
• Using the augmented UDS framework herein for the
first detailed exploration of the benefits of combining
mimicry-resistant web authentication techniques with
ubiquitous password-based user-to-web authentication.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 provides background. Section 3 introduces the mimicry-
resistance dimension in web authentication, and plots a repre-
sentative subset of authentication schemes onto an Exposure-
Mimicry two-dimensional space. Section 4 evaluates relatively
little-explored schemes found to have mimicry resistance,
using a modified UDS framework with new properties ad-
dressing the mimicry resistance dimension. Section 5 analyzes
benefits when the aforementioned schemes are combined with
passwords. Section 6 concludes.
2 Background and Context
We briefly provide background and define terms for modes
of authentication (Fig. 1) and review related work on the
evaluation of authentication schemes.
The standard method of user authentication on the web
is for the user to type a password into a web form, which
is submitted over HTTP(S) for the web server to verify. We
refer to this as user-to-web (see Fig. 1) authentication—even
though the password is physically entered into the user’s local
device, the verifier is a remote web server. The device used
for authentication, which we call the access device herein,
Fig. 1. A comparison between user-to-device, device-to-web, and user-
to-web (directly).
passively conveys the authentication token,1 and does no
checking on behalf of the web server. In contrast, when a
user authenticates to their smartphone, it is user-to-device.
Some authentication schemes that appear to be user-to-web
are actually two-stage authentication schemes that combine
a user-to-device scheme and a device-to-web scheme; for
example, a mobile payment app may authenticate the user
via a biometric (e.g., fingerprint or iris scan), which unlocks a
locally-stored cryptographic key used by the mobile device to
authenticate to the remote server.
Implicit vs. invisible authentication. Implicit au-
thentication [11] schemes reduce user burden by authenti-
cating users without requiring any deliberate user effort at
login time by, e.g., measuring and using users’ biometric
attributes or physiological behaviors for authentication. Many
such schemes have been proposed [12] [13] [6], and are typi-
cally used for user-to-device authentication; the accuracy and
resistance to mimicry of some of these schemes have been
evaluated [6]. In contrast, herein we consider web authentica-
tion schemes, thus focusing on user-to-web and device-to-web
authentication. As such, user-to-device (e.g., [14] [15]) and
similarly other paradigms such as device-to-device (e.g., [16]
[17]), are out of the scope of our work.
We also make the distinction between implicit and invisi-
ble schemes. The former refers to schemes that do not require
extra user effort during login, but do require some initial user
effort for setup; those are generally user-to-device schemes
that authenticate the user based on their behaviour as mea-
sured through various sensors (e.g., accelerometer, swipe pat-
terns), where the initial user effort is often downloading an
app, or calibrating input sensors. On the other hand, we define
invisible schemes to be device-to-web authentication schemes
requiring no user involvement at all, neither during set-up nor
login. Note that not all device-to-web schemes are invisible,
as some require a user to carry out an action; for example, in
a device-to-web scheme that fingerprints the access device’s
accelerometer while at rest [18], users may need to place their
device on a flat surface.
3 The Mimicry Resistance Dimension
User authentication typically relies on something-you-know
(i.e., some secret the user knows), something-you-have, or
something-you-are. Biometric-based user-to-web authentica-
tion mechanisms (i.e., something-you-are) are similar in
server-side implementation to something-you-know, since bio-
metric data is (preferably) stored as a digital secret. Since
the transmission path from the user’s biometric sensor (e.g.,
1. We use the terms token (by default indicating a digital token
such as a password) and credential interchangeably. Hardware tokens
will be explicitly identified.
3fingerprint reader) to the authentication server is often un-
trusted, or at least less so than the path from the sensor to an
authenticating application in user-to-device authentication,
an attacker may defeat authentication by simply replaying
an exposed secret (e.g., a fingerprint). Exposure can occur
through, e.g., guessing or capture. Most something-you-know
and something-you-are web authentication schemes offer lim-
ited resistance to mimicry, since exposure of a user secret
typically allows attackers to trivially defeat the scheme.
User authentication via something-you-have requires veri-
fying servers to both authenticate the hardware token and to
verify user possession of the hardware token. Hardware tokens
are generally electronic devices (e.g., a USB OTP token or
smartphone) that can be authenticated by the server using,
e.g., cryptographic techniques.2 Because authenticating these
hardware tokens will almost always rely on secrets, something-
you-have often boils down to a something-you-know, i.e.,
something the hardware token knows. Most known variations
of hardware authenticator tokens are defeated once that secret
is exposed [1], e.g., by capture or theft, again providing little
to no resistance to mimicry.
3.1 The Exposure-Mimicry Duality
Defeating web authentication typically requires two actions:
exposing a token and mimicking certain behavior. That be-
havior is any action the legitimate user (or device) normally
performs while authenticating to a service; for passwords, that
behavior is trivially mimicked by simply submitting a static
string. A scheme’s resistance to compromise thus depends
on its ability to independently resist exposure and mimicry.
To evaluate a scheme’s resistance across these orthogonal
components, we construct a two-dimensional space in Fig. 2
and plot various web authentication schemes on it. A marker
(i.e., dot) represents a scheme’s authentication token. Height
along the y-axis indicates resilience to exposure; distance from
the origin along the x-axis indicates resilience to mimicry.
Schemes placed on the chart are explained in Section 3.3.
3.1.1 Vertical axis
The y-axis of Fig. 2 is split into three segments: V1-Negligible-
resistance (i.e., guessable), V2-Guess-resistant, and V3-Leak-
resistant. Guessing a credential is the easiest form of exposure.
Digital theft (leak henceforth) is generally easier than physical
theft in that (1) leaks can often be arranged at scale, e.g.,
by phishing, and (2) leaks can be by remote access, e.g., an
Internet-facing authentication server is subject to attack from
anywhere in the world (an adversary need not be in physical
proximity).
V1. Within the lower-vertical segment, a credential re-
quiring more guesses is placed higher. The guessability of a
scheme’s credential may depend on several factors. A very
weak password, for example, could be easier to guess than
a randomly-generated PIN. Unless stated otherwise, schemes
are plotted according to their strength in typical scenarios
(e.g., passwords are assumed to be user-chosen, which limits
their resilience to guessing). Guessing attacks are assumed
to follow common guessing strategies for trawling attacks
2. Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) do not hide a key,
but still have a component that may be exposed albeit harder to
reproduce/mimic. See Section 3.3.4 for further discussion.
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Fig. 2. Exposure resistance and mimicry resistance as two dimensions
to measure authentication-scheme resistance to compromise. Along
each axis, distance from the origin reflects the scalability of attacks
required to defeat a scheme: those plotted closer to the origin (darker
regions) can be defeated by attacks that can be scaled with ease (such
as online guessing) to break a large number of accounts; defeating
schemes plotted further from the origin requires more targeted attacks
(such as device theft) that are highly unscalable. Section 3.3 gives
detailed explanations of different classes of one time passwords (OTPn),
device fingerprinting (FPn), geolocation (Ln) techniques, and physically
unclonable functions (PUFn).
(capturing as many accounts as possible, often by guessing
the most common password across all accounts, then moving
down a list of candidate passwords).
V2. The middle-vertical segment comprises schemes with
secrets impractical to guess, such as cryptographic keys or
randomly-generated passwords with sufficient length to with-
stand offline guessing attacks. Those may still be leaked (e.g.,
client-side malware). Malware may either (1) steal login cre-
dentials for later user impersonation, or (2) remain dormant
until a user logs into their account, after which attacker-
created transactions can be authorized by the malware on the
victim user’s device [19]. Herein we are interested in evalu-
ating an authentication scheme’s resilience to impersonation,
not to malicious authorization. Defending against the latter
may require mechanisms such as out-of-band authorization
for sensitive transactions (which may be independent from
the method of user authentication being used).
We consider within this segment four sublevels, based
on the number of sources from which leaks may occur: the
human user, the browser, the user device (e.g., laptop or
smartphone), and a public server whose compromise defeats
authentication; e.g., a trusted third party of the main authen-
tication server, or a party that also stores the same credential
(e.g., a same password used across multiple websites). A
scheme subject to leaks from all four sources is placed at the
lowest of V2’s four sublevels; one subject to leaks from any
three places it second-lowest, and so on. A scheme not subject
to leaks from any of these four sources is placed in V3.
4V3. Schemes in the upper-vertical segment are those
resilient to exposure by digital theft (e.g., leak or capture)—
thus mostly physical tokens of some sort. Compromising these
requires targeted attacks (most commonly physical theft) in-
volving physical proximity to specifically pre-identified users.
A scheme’s vertical position within V3 varies with vulnera-
bility to theft. A smartphone for example, relatively small in
size and carried around more often, is easier to steal than a
desktop PC—the latter may require physical break-in to an
office and effort to conceal the escape.
Sorting rationale. The intuition behind arranging the
three segments in the above manner follows logically from
the trawling attack strategy of maximizing the number of
accounts broken into per unit of attack effort. Assuming, for
example, that a website does not throttle online password
guessing, a good attack strategy is to try guessing passwords.
If online guessing fails, an attacker often moves to digital
theft (V2 segment on Fig. 2), e.g., stealing credentials via
XSS attacks, phishing, or client-side malware. Since random
passwords may be leaked but not efficiently guessed, they are
harder to expose. Weak passwords or PINs, for example, can
be guessed and often also captured,3 and are rated lower in
resistance to exposure. If all forms of leaks (digital theft) fail,
the attacker is left with physically stealing, e.g., a smartphone
or hardware authentication token. These attacks also become
gradually harder to scale (for an adversary) in the aforemen-
tioned order.
Relationship to UDS framework. As summarized in
Table 1, the vertical axis in Fig. 2 addresses the S (Security)
benefits in the UDS framework, excluding Unlinkable and
Requiring-Explicit-Consent.4 The UDS framework did not
intend to provide an overall summary rating for a scheme,
as that would require subjective weighting of the usability,
security, and deployability benefits (which may be context-
dependent). In contrast, we use our sorting rationale (as dis-
cussed above) in conjunction with the UDS security benefits
to rate a scheme’s overall resistance to exposure; for example,
if a scheme only fails to provide Resilient-to-Unthrottled-
Guessing but provides the remaining eight security proper-
ties, it is placed near the bottom of the vertical axis within
V1 (despite having a virtually full row of security bullets).
Passwords fail to provide Resilient-to-Throttled-Guessing and
Resilient-to-Unthrottled-Guessing and are therefore placed in
V1, despite providing Resilient-to-Physical-Theft (which cor-
responds to our highest exposure resistance category, segment
V3).
Method for Plotting Schemes (Vertical Axis).
Schemes are plotted along the vertical axis (see Section 3.3 for
placement rationale) based on their security benefits offered.
For schemes already evaluated in the UDS paper [1] we use
3. An example where a password can be guessed but not leaked
would be challenge-response schemes where the password is never
typed on the keyboard nor stored anywhere (neither on the server
nor any client device), such that the user computes the response from
the challenge in their head, or offline using a calculator. That would
be resilient to phishing, theft, malware, leaks from verifiers, requires
no trusted third parties, and possibly physical observation.
4. These two security benefits from the original UDS framework do
not share the focus of Fig. 2 on exposure-resistance. Unlinkable is a
privacy benefit and Requiring-Explicit-Consent relates to malicious
authorization, e.g., a malicious RFID-based card reader embedded in
a sofa that authorizes a transaction without user knowledge [1].
TABLE 1
Original UDS security benefits [1] evaluating schemes by susceptibility
to exposure, and relation to new framework. This table lists the
properties a scheme must offer to move to the next-higher vertical
segment in Fig. 2; i.e., both S3 and S4 must be offered to be placed in
V2; all of S1, S3-S7 and S9 must be offered to be placed in V3. The
benefits are listed in descending order of the scalability of carrying out
the corresponding attack; e.g., guessing attacks (S3) are highly
scalable, but physical theft (S8) is highly unscalable.
UDS Security Property Segment
S3. Resilient-to-Throttled-Guessing Lower (V1)S4. Resilient-to-Unthrottled-Guessing
S1. Resilient-to-Physical-Observation
Middle (V2)
S5. Resilient-to-Internal-Observation
S6. Resilient-to-Leaks-from-Other-Verifiers
S7. Resilient-to-Phishing
S9. No-Trusted-Third-Party∗
S2. Resilient-to-Targeted-Impersonation† Upper (V3)S8. Resilient-to-Physical-Theft
∗Additional third parties increase chances of leaks from public servers.
From the adversary’s perspective, this property is similar to Leaks-
from-Other-Verifiers. See inline for details.
†S2 encompasses a variety of targeted attacks, e.g., deceiving a human
acting as a trusted party as in social re-authentication [20], locating a
user’s password written on a post-it note, or lifting fingerprints from
a doorknob [1]. The success of these attacks require attackers to be in
physical or logical proximity (e.g., social engineering attacks against
social re-authentication) to victims. The difficulty in scaling such
targeted attacks is similar to attacks involving physical theft (S8).
These differ from more scalable attacks such as educated guessing
based on information scraped en-masse from social media—these are
covered by the more general guessing attacks (S3 and S4).
the rating given therein. The following criteria (based on the
mappings in Table 1) are used to decide which of the three
vertical segments (V1, V2, V3) the scheme will fall into:
1) Schemes subject to guessing attacks (i.e., not offering
both S3 and S4) are placed in V1.5
2) Schemes offering S3 and S4, but lacking any of S1, S5-7,
or S9, are placed in V2.
3) Schemes offering all of the above benefits are placed in
V3.
Moreover, each vertical segment has sublevels that are de-
termined based on the number of security benefits captured
within each segment, as specified in Table 1. Each segment
has precisely
∑N+1
i=2 i sublevels, where N is the number of
benefits associated with that segment; thus, V1 and V3 each
have five sublevels, and V2 has 14 sublevels. Each scheme is
assigned to a sublevel such that a security benefit offered (i.e.,
represented by a filled-circle “•” in Table 3) has a greater score
than any number of partially-offered benefits (i.e., represented
by an empty-circle “◦” in Table 3). For example, a scheme that
offers all V1 benefits but no V2 benefits would be placed at
the first sublevel of V2; a scheme that partially offers four V2
benefits would be placed at the fifth sublevel of V2; a scheme
5. When evaluating specific implementations of authentication
schemes, resistance to guessing attacks can be more precisely calcu-
lated (e.g., based on the specific throttling techniques used); V1 could
then be divided into more granular sublevels based on the number
of guesses required to break a scheme. Schemes breakable with zero
guesses would be plotted at the origin, and schemes breakable with
an offline guessing attack of just under 1020 guesses (the approximate
threshold at which a scheme would be considered to be resistant to
offline guessing attacks [21]) would be plotted at the upper boundary
of V1.
5TABLE 2
Three new UDS-type security properties (given in Section 4) directly
related to mimicry. A scheme must achieve these to move further right
across the horizontal segments in Fig. 2. Example: Both M2 and M3
must be achieved to be placed in H3.
New UDS Security Properties Segment
M2. Resilient-to-Infrequent-Capture-or-Intercept Left-most (H1)
M3. Verifies-Non-Static-Information Middle (H2)
M4. Resilient-to-Spoofing Right-most (H3)
that offers one V2 benefit and partially offers one V2 benefit
would be placed at the seventh sublevel of V2; and so on.6
3.1.2 Horizontal axis
The x-axis (Mimicry Resistance) reflects burdens on the at-
tacker to mimic the verifier-expected behavior, after exposing
a scheme’s credential. Unfortunately, the security of most
authentication schemes proposed to date rely on some form
of resisting exposure, with compromise complete once an
underlying secret token is revealed. This includes passwords,
user-to-web physical biometrics (see Section 2), and poorly
managed/generated private keys [22]. If leaking a credential
does not allow an attacker access by direct replay of the
credential, the scheme exhibits some degree of mimicry resis-
tance, and gains horizontal distance from the origin in Fig. 2.
We split the horizontal axis into three segments: H1-
Negligible-resistance (i.e., easily replayable), H2-Replay-
resistant, and H3-Spoof-resistant. In Section 4, we expand the
UDS framework by six new benefits; three of these benefits
(M2, M3, and M4) correspond to the aforementioned horizon-
tal segments (H1, H2, and H3) as specified by Table 2.
H1. If an attacker can simply submit or replay a credential
after exposing it, the scheme provides no resistance to replay
and thus gains no horizontal distance along the Mimicry Re-
sistance dimension (i.e., lies on the vertical axis). For example,
replaying a captured password is trivial; thus, passwords lie
directly on the vertical axis in Fig. 2.
In some cases, there is no clear-cut answer as to whether
exposing information directly helps the attacker gain access.
For example, answers to personal knowledge questions based
on recent account activity (e.g., who was the last person you
emailed?) likely remain unchanged for a few hours. Captur-
ing an answer allows the attacker to login only within that
window. Such schemes are given some horizontal distance
from the origin, but remain within H1. Another example is
password expiration policies [23], [24] forcing resets every,
e.g., one hour, which would provide some mimicry resistance
(albeit highly unusable), and placed within H1 on Fig. 2.
Some challenge-response schemes are also candidates for
H1; whether or not a captured response directly allows the
attacker to compromise the account is conditional on whether
the captured response remains valid. Schemes where the set
of challenge-response pairs is finite and relatively small, or
when capturing a handful of challenge-response pairs suffices
for defeating authentication, would thus fall within H1. Cogni-
tive schemes like Weinshall [25], and some challenge-response
6. To avoid visual ambiguity, no sublevels are plotted at the bound-
ary between any two segments, namely the V1-V2 and V2-V3 bound-
aries on the vertical axis or the H1-H2 and H2-H3 boundaries on the
horizontal axis. Therefore, no schemes are placed at these boundaries.
schemes such as PassWindow [26], are prominent examples.
Other challenge-response schemes are placed in H2.
H2. After a credential is leaked, schemes that either
require additional attacker actions beyond simply replaying
a string or conducting a straightforward operation (e.g.,
cryptographic signing), or where attackers have a limited
time window (e.g., < 2 mins) in which the credential can be
used, are considered replay-resistant and placed within H2.
An example is DNS resolver fingerprinting (FP5 in Fig. 2),
which determines the DNS resolver used by the client (see
Section 3.3.2); knowing the resolver’s address is insufficient to
defeat authentication, as the attacker must also be able to use
it to resolve domain names.
One-time password (OTP) over SMS is another example
scheme placed within H2, as it enables the attacker to com-
promise the account only if the user has not already used the
OTP. An attacker that captures the OTP in clear text [27]
must use it before the legitimate (victim) user. Additionally,
the server may set a 2-minute time window where an OTP
token is valid for usage, and expires afterwards. Such schemes
would be placed within H2 on Fig. 2.
H3. We place within H3 any scheme that requires addi-
tional equipment and/or systems (e.g., hardware chip man-
ufacturers, or large scale distributed botnets) to mimic the
behavior that the server measures and expects from the
legitimate user. An example is robust location verification (see
L4 in Section 3.3.1).
Because spoof-resistant schemes rely on measurements
of various phenomena (e.g., a user behavior or habit), the
measurement process must typically allow some degree of
tolerance to account for (1) imperfections in the measuring
apparatus, or (2) the phenomena’s natural instability over
time.
For (1), consider an example location-based authentica-
tion scheme [28], where a server grants access to a user only
if the user is at an expected geographic location. Ideally, the
user’s location would be identified to such a high granularity
that no two human beings could exist at the same {latitude,
longitude, altitude} coordinates.
For (2), again using location-based authentication as an
example, a user’s daily commute [29] from one geographic
location to another (e.g., work to home) makes it impractical
to grant account access only when the user is geographically
present in, e.g., a 1m2 area, even if the geolocation mechanism
being used allows for such high accuracy. Geolocating users
with courser granularity (e.g., city-level) would thus seem
more practical (e.g., to avoid false rejects) for generic location-
based authentication purposes.
The degree of “fuzziness” (i.e., lack of precision) intro-
duced while measuring a user’s behavior in spoof-resistant
schemes is thus likely to result in false accepts, i.e., falsely
accepting another user as the intended one. In practice, some
websites use IP-address based location look-ups [30] to imple-
ment location-aware authentication, which returns locations
at the city or state level. Thus, all attackers physically present
in the user’s city (or even a legitimate user mistyping the
username with no malicious intent, i.e., if geolocation is used
as a stand-alone authentication scheme) are falsely accepted.
Note the distinction between false accepts (a result of
imprecision) and mimicry resistance (a result of resistance to
attack): A scheme that uses high-precision GPS coordinates
6(e.g., within a radius of 1m) reported by the user browser
(e.g., L1, Section 3.3.1) may offer low false accept rate, but
offers no mimicry-resistance since attackers can use browser
extensions that report forged coordinates.
False accepts are not directly reflected in the Mimicry-
Resistant dimension (though we capture them in the evalua-
tion framework in Section 4). They are indirectly captured
however by a scheme’s position vertically. This is because
resilience to guessing attacks and resilience to false accepts are
both related to the size and distribution of the credential space
(e.g., cryptographic keys with sufficient length and chosen
uniformly at random are not subject to guessing attacks and
false accepts).
Method for Plotting Schemes (Horizontal Axis).
Schemes are plotted along the horizontal axis based on their
mimicry-resistance benefits offered. The following criteria
(based on the mappings in Table 2) are used to decide which
of the three horizontal segments (H1, H2, H3) the scheme will
fall into:
1) Schemes that do not offer benefits M2, M3, and M4 offer
no mimicry-resistance, and thus are placed on the vertical
axis (i.e., with zero horizontal displacement).
2) Schemes offering M2 are placed in segment H1.
3) Schemes offering M3 are placed in segment H2.
4) Schemes offering M4 are placed in segment H3.
Since H1, H2, and H3 are each associated with a single ben-
efit (see Table 2), each horizontal segment has two sublevels,
where the first sublevel represents a partially-offered benefit
and the second sublevel represents a fully-offered benefit.
3.2 Interpreting Attack Scalability
Figure 2 illustrates the relative resilience of schemes against
attackers that aim to maximize the number of accounts bro-
ken into (i.e., trawling attacks). Along each individual axis,
schemes further from the origin are less susceptible to scalable
attacks. Scalable attacks are defined as attacks that can be
scaled to break into a large number of accounts. Non-scalable
attacks are typically highly targeted (e.g., physical device
theft); such attacks impose a higher cost on the attacker in
terms of time, effort, and/or money, as a function of the total
number of accounts targeted.
As our evaluation is qualitative, it is not intended that
absolute distance from the origin be a quantitative measure
suitable for comparing schemes. However, the resilience of
two schemes (i.e., scalability of the attacks that a scheme
can withstand) can be compared if (1) they share one of
the two coordinates (i.e., identical x- or y-coordinates), or
(2) one of the schemes is further from the origin along both
its x- and y-coordinates. When comparing any two schemes
that satisfy one of these conditions, a scheme that offers both
high exposure-resistance (i.e., high y-value in Fig. 2) and
high mimicry-resistance (i.e., high x-value in Fig. 2) is more
costly (less scalable) to attack, since it requires the attacker
to successfully mount both an exposure attack and mimicry
attack, as elaborated on below.
Along the vertical (exposure-resistance) axis, schemes
most vulnerable to scalable attacks are those where the
attacker can guess user credentials (V1). Attacks against
schemes requiring information theft (e.g., via software vul-
nerabilities or malware) are less scalable (V2), and schemes
requiring physical device theft (V3) are the least scalable (i.e.,
most costly) to attack.
Along the horizontal (mimicry-resistance) axis, attacks
against schemes where an exposed secret can be used as-is
by the attacker (see Section 3.1) are most scalable; attack
scalability decreases for schemes that increase the attacker
burden (in terms of hardware costs or control of network in-
frastructure) for mimicking account-holders beyond a simple
replay attack or capture of a static secret (see Table 2).
3.3 Scheme Placement on Figure 2
We use the mapping method of Section 3.1.1 (“Relationship
to UDS framework”) to position a representative subset of
schemes along the exposure-resistance axis using their previ-
ously assessed (cf. [1, p.11]) security benefits. Upon evaluating
the mimicry-resistance of these schemes, we find they offer
little to no resistance to mimicry as we explain below.
PassWindow [26] is a visual crypto technique whereby the
user overlays a transparency card on the screen to visually
read and enter a 4-digit pass-code, which proves possession
of the user’s card. It was shown [31] that observing 20–30
challenge/response pairs can leak the card’s secret; we thus
place the scheme within H1. Likewise, cognitive schemes,
including GrIDsure [32], Weinshall [25], Hopper Blum [33],
and Word Association [34] are placed in H1 since the schemes
can be compromised after few observations (e.g., Weinshall
can be compromised after about seven observations [35]).
In social re-authentication [20], a trusted friend can vouch
for a user who, e.g., has lost their credentials. An attacker may
capture a vouch code (e.g., via malware on a trusted friend’s
device) and simply replay it to authenticate as the victim; we
thus place it in H1.
Federated schemes, including OpenID [36], Microsoft
Passport [37], Facebook Connect, and BrowserID [38], offer
no mimicry-resistance if password authentication is used, and
we thus place them in H1. Their position on the chart would
change if the identity provider utilizes mimicry-resistant
schemes. Persuasive Cued Click-Points (PCCP) [39] and bio-
metric schemes on Fig. 2 (Iris and Voice) are also placed in H1,
since captured biometric samples are typically replayable [1].
We explore and discuss example schemes which do provide
certain mimicry-resistance, and position them along the two
axes (the remaining schemes on Fig. 2). To avoid redundancy,
we only explain the horizontal position of these schemes in
this section; see Section 4 for their vertical position.
3.3.1 Geolocation (selected methods)
We review four broad classes of Internet geolocation tech-
niques that can be used for location-based authentication,
placing a marker for each class on Fig. 2 to rate their ability
to resist compromise. Location-based authentication typically
requires server-side storage of the user’s expected location
(e.g., city-level, nation/state level, or latitude/longitude co-
ordinates, depending on the geolocation method employed)
in plain text, hashed, or cloaked [40] to a certain degree to
preserve users’ privacy. Any of the four classes of geolocation
methods described below may be used by a verifying server to
obtain and/or verify the user’s current location at the time of
authentication, and grant access if the user is verified to be at
the location expected by the server.
7L1: GPS and WPS. GPS and WiFi Positioning System
(WPS) geolocation are commonly used in practice. WPS uses
multi-lateration based on the signal strengths between the
device and nearby WiFi access points with known locations.
These techniques are usually selected by the user’s browser in
the W3C geolocation API [41], whereby the browser obtains
the coordinates from the device’s GPS driver, or from a
location provider after submitting a list of nearby WiFi access
points and their signal strengths to the location provider. L1
gains no depth across the Mimicry Resistance dimension (see
Fig. 2), since techniques rely on browser-reported information
that can be substituted and replayed by an attacker, so knowl-
edge of the user’s location is sufficient to break authentication.
L2: IP-address based tabulation. Tabulation-based
geolocation service providers such as Maxmind7 and ipinfo8
maintain lookup tables, which map IP address blocks to cities
and countries, possibly through publicly available information
such as IP address registries (e.g., whois9) and the geography
of IP address allocation. Geolocation based on IP address
table lookups is unreliable due to outdated entries [30], and
is evadable through use of middleboxes and virtual private
networks (VPNs) [42]. L2 is rated slightly more resilient to
compromise than forgeable GPS/WPS coordinates, and is
placed within H2; it is not in H3 since even an attacker unable
to forge source IP addresses may use public HTTP proxies or
bots in close proximity to the user.
L3: Measurement-based geolocation. In this class,
network measurements, such as Round-Trip Times (RTTs),
are conducted from a set of landmarks (e.g., cloud-based or
CDN servers) to the target user, and are then mapped to
geographic distances using a pre-calibrated delay-to-distance
function. The user’s location is estimated through multi-
lateration, relative to the landmarks’ locations. Examples
include Spotter [43] and CBG [44]. Other proposals have sug-
gested mapping the network topology for higher accuracy [45].
To date, measurement-based geolocation can achieve an accu-
racy on the order of a few tens of meters. Manipulating L3
requires more advanced techniques than simply submitting
forged coordinates, but can be achieved with enough knowl-
edge of the network topology and the landmarks/verifiers
being used [46], [47]; they are limited to H2.
L4: Robust location verification. Some techniques are
designed to verify location information obtained by other In-
ternet geolocation techniques (e.g., L1-L3, above), and/or are
designed to be resilient to common adversarial manipulation
tactics. The result of a preliminary geolocation is treated as an
asserted location (analogous to a username asserting identity),
to be verified by a measurement-based proof (analogous to
proof of knowledge of a secret). Examples of such schemes
include Client Presence Verification (CPV) [48] (see Sec-
tion 4) and Trusted Platform Module (TPM)-supported GPS
drivers [49]; the former cryptographically protects network
delay measurements used for verifying location assertions,
and the latter communicates coordinates securely. We call
such techniques robust location verification and rate them as
spoof-resistant (H3) because manipulation requires attackers
to expend more effort than simply reporting a false location;
7. https://www.maxmind.com/
8. http://ipinfo.io/
9. https://www.whois.net/
successfully spoofing legitimate client locations requires using
specialized proxy machines (for attacks that “co-locate” using
a machine nearby to the victim) or GPS satellite signal-
spoofing devices [50].
3.3.2 Device Fingerprinting
Device fingerprinting refers to techniques by which a server
collects information on a device’s hardware/software configu-
ration for the purpose of identification [7]. From 29 methods
recently surveyed [51], we derive six representative categories
for evaluation.
FP1: System parameters/preferences. This class in-
cludes software and hardware information about the device to
be authenticated, provided by the web browser’s JavaScript
API (e.g., the navigator and windows JavaScript BOM ob-
jects), such as operating system version, screen resolution,
time zone, system language, and supported WebGL capabili-
ties. FP1 lies on the y-axis, since it can simply be mimicked
by replaying the information.
FP2: Audio and canvas challenge/response. This
class includes two techniques that fingerprint the client’s
graphics and audio subsystems, respectively. HTML5 canvas
fingerprinting renders a variety of text and graphics in an
HTML5 canvas on the client’s browser, which results in subtly
different images (e.g., due to differences in anti-aliasing or font
smoothing) depending on the graphics driver and hardware on
the device being fingerprinted. Audio processing fingerprint-
ing leverages the HTML AudioContext API that provides real-
time frequency- and time-domain analysis of audio playback,
mainly used for creating audio visualizations. Playing the
same sound on different devices results in subtly different
waveforms, depending on the sound driver and hardware. To
improve resistance to replay attacks, these two techniques can
be used in a challenge-response scheme, where the server can
store the client’s responses to many different challenges [52],
and are thus placed within H2.
FP3: Hardware sensors. This class, suitable to finger-
print smartphones, leverages the inherent variation in the
manufacturing and factory calibration of typical smartphone
sensors, such as accelerometer and speaker-microphone sys-
tems. Similar to FP1, FP3 lies on the y-axis since information
can simply be replayed.
FP4: Clock skew. The server uses TCP timestamps to
measure the clock skew of the device being fingerprinted,
which differs across devices due to manufacturing variation.
FP4 is placed within H3, since clock skew spoofing attacks
are highly sophisticated; e.g., Arackaparambil et al. show
how timestamp manipulation can be detected to identify
rogue wireless LAN access points [53]. However, clock-skew
spoofing over a WAN connection is not well-studied, and
therefore this rating may change subject to further study and
experimentation.
FP5: DNS resolver. The server determines a client’s
DNS resolver(s) by presenting to the client a page that
contains a reference to a randomly-generated (non-existent)
subdomain, triggering a client DNS lookup; as a result the
server will receive a DNS query from the client’s resolver.
The DNS resolver’s IP address serves as a fingerprint. FP5
provides partial replay-resistance but can be defeated via the
use of proxies, similar to L2. In some cases, organizations run
their own DNS servers, which resolve domain names only to
8machines within the department’s network. To use a victim’s
DNS resolver, an attacker would need to be able to resolve
domain names using the organization’s private DNS server.
Since identifying the server is not enough (and is easier than
using the organization’s DNS), FP5 is placed within H2.
FP6: Protocol-based fingerprinting. This class in-
cludes schemes that glean information from network-,
transport-, and application-layer protocol fields. For example,
the TLS library of the client device can be fingerprinted
using the Client Hello packet received during the handshake
sequence, which includes information such as the device’s sup-
ported TLS version, supported ciphersuites (and their order
of presentation), compression options, and list of supported
extensions (along with associated parameters such as elliptic
curve parameters). FP6 lies within H1, since it is susceptible
to mimicry, but attacks are less scalable than simply replaying
a static string; OS- or library-level modifications may be
required.
3.3.3 OTP Schemes
One-time password (OTP) schemes generate short-lived cre-
dentials, often used as a second factor alongside conventional
passwords. Depending on implementation (four follow), an
attacker may aim to capture either the seed or a challenge-
response pair.
OTP1: OTP mobile apps. This class (e.g., Google
Authenticator) generates OTPs to be manually typed into a
user’s access device, using a combination of a locally-stored
shared secret and either the current time (TOTP [10]) or
a counter (HOTP [54]). With malware on the device, the
attacker can capture the locally-stored shared secret; because
this directly enables the attacker to compromise the account,
OTP1 provides no resistance to mimicry, and is placed on the
vertical axis of Fig. 2. Note: A variant of this class is a mobile
app that stores a public-private key pair, e.g., as used by Duo
Security [55] and Google Prompt (a more recent iteration of
Google two-step verification [56]). When the user types in
their password, the server sends a cryptographic challenge
to the mobile app. The mobile app then requests user con-
sent, via simply tapping a button, to send the cryptographic
response to the server to complete the user authentication
process. The advantage of this approach compared to OTP1
is that it is more efficient to use. The disadvantages are that
the mobile app requires an Internet connection, and there is
a chance of the user accidentally consenting to a malicious
authentication attempt.
OTP2: OTP USB tokens. This class (e.g., FIDO U2F
keys [57]) is similar to OTP1, but requires less effort since
the user can press a button on the hardware token to auto-
matically enter the OTP into a browser window. Assuming
hardware tokens can resist malware, it becomes relatively
challenging for an attacker to capture challenge-response
pairs. Similar to OTP1, the attacker can thus target the
seed, i.e., hardware token theft. This gives the attacker direct
account compromise, and therefore is placed on the vertical
axis (i.e., no horizontal distance from the origin) in Fig. 2.
OTP3: SMS OTP. The server sends a randomly-
generated OTP (i.e., no reliance on a shared secret/seed) to
the user via SMS. Contrary to the previous two OTP classes,
the seed here is only stored on the server, which makes it
harder to capture. The attacker can however capture an OTP
in transit, e.g., by exploring weaknesses in the cellular net-
work [27], but will be required to use it before it expires (and
before the user uses it). Since the time window for a successful
attack is limited, OTP3 is placed further (horizontally) from
the origin, in H2 on Fig. 2.
OTP4: E-mail OTP. The server sends a randomly-
generated OTP (again no reliance on a shared secret/seed)
to the user via e-mail. Because an attacker can capture an
OTP, e.g., via malware on the user’s machine, its mimicry-
resistance is similar to OTP3.
3.3.4 PUFs
Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are hardware mod-
ules (typically manufactured into silicon-based chips) that
leverage an underlying unique physical structure to generate
challenge-response pairs; ideal PUFs are impossible to clone,
since the unique structure of each individual PUF results from
manufacturing variation [9]. For our evaluation herein, we
assume the use a challenge-response protocol (as described
by Yu et al. [9]) in conjunction with PUFs that are built into
the user’s device (as opposed to, e.g., a USB-based token).
PUF1: Strong PUFs. These theoretically generate an
endless supply of challenge-response pairs, allowing verifying
servers to store any number of challenge-response pairs (e.g.,
at user account creation) to be used for user authentication.
Several implementations of strong PUFs are available [58];
e.g., some PUFs generate challenge-response pairs by shining
a laser on a scattering object at selected angles and points
of incidence [59]. A major challenge in developing strong
PUFs is to avoid susceptibility to model-building attacks that
collect challenge-response pairs and apply machine-learning
algorithms to build a mathematical model of the PUF [60].
PUF1 lies in V3, since the only security property it lacks from
Table 1 is Resilient-to-Physical-Theft; device theft allows an
attacker to directly impersonate the user (i.e., defeat authen-
tication), and therefore no mimicry-resistance is offered.
PUF2: Weak PUFs. These can only generate a limited
number of challenge-response pairs. They are suitable for au-
thentication when augmented with appropriate mechanisms,
e.g., when restricted to only responding to challenges sent
from a single trusted verifier over an authenticated channel
[9]; this limits an attacker’s ability to exhaustively capture
all possible challenge/response pairs to mount a mimicry at-
tack. PUF devices are commercially available, e.g., for device
authentication and cryptographic key storage [61]. PUF2 is
placed within H2—it lacks Resilient-to-Internal-Observation
from Table 1, but a successful mimicry attack can be mounted
by building a mathematical model of the PUF only after
capturing a sufficient number of challenge/response pairs
(e.g., via man-in-the-middle); however, since every PUF is
unique, the mathematical model would be device-specific.
Counterintuitively, PUF2 exhibits higher mimicry-resistance
than PUF1—however, recall that the strength of a scheme is
determined by both exposure- and mimicry-resistance. While
PUF2 can be mimicked by a determined and targeted attacker
even without device posession, a successful attack against
PUF1 requires device posession (thereby obviating the need
for mimicry), justifying PUF1’s higher placement within V3.
93.3.5 Sound-Proof
Sound-Proof [62] is an authentication scheme that determines
whether the user’s smartphone and access device (i.e., another
device from which the user is authenticating to access their
online account) are in close proximity. The access device
records ambient sound from the microphone and transmits
it to the smartphone (via the Internet), which compares with
the sound recorded by its own microphone. A match indicates
that both devices are in an identical noise environment, and
therefore likely in close proximity, resulting in the smartphone
sending a cryptographically-signed assertion to the web server
to approve the user authentication.
We include Sound-Proof in our evaluation as it provides a
degree of mimicry-resistance if a trusted channel is established
between the smartphone and web server, e.g., by means of
a TPM (via a trusted execution environment and secure
key storage). A TPM-augmented Sound-Proof would address
attacks where, e.g., the attacker can steal the key via root-
privileged malware and use it to sign assertions. Note that
while Sound-Proof was originally proposed and evaluated as
a second factor alongside passwords, we place it on Fig. 2
as a single-factor scheme (without passwords)—Section 3.4
explains our rationale.
Although a TPM-based implementation may render it
impractical for an attacker to steal the Sound-Proof app’s
cryptographic key from the user’s smartphone and thus gain
permanent access to the account, the attacker may still use a
malicious app on the user’s device to relay recorded audio. For
example, the attacker can reproduce the ambient sound from
the environment in which the user’s smartphone is currently
located, e.g., by leveraging malware on the user’s smartphone
or a nearby device to record and relay the ambient sound to
the attacker. Sound-Proof is thus placed in H2 because this
process is more sophisticated than simply replaying a static
token. It is not placed in H1, since repeated (physical or
internal) observations do not seem to help the attacker gain
permanent access—the authors show [62] that the scheme is
resilient to guessing attacks even when the attacker knows the
user’s environment (e.g., by using typical background noise
from a Starbucks coffee shop), and that attacks are also made
more difficult by requiring the sound files recorded by both
devices to be timestamped (with NTP-synchronized clocks).
3.4 Further Insights
We briefly discuss further insights from our analysis of
mimicry resistance, and the relative strengths of schemes
plotted in Fig. 2.
Multi-factor authentication. Fig. 2 should be used
to evaluate individual authentication schemes. To evaluate
a multi-factor scheme, the scheme must be broken down to
its constituent factors, each represented individually as an
independent marker. Two independent markers can then be
combined as a two-factor scheme as follows: the (x,y) position
of the resultant (combined) scheme is the greater of both x-
values and both y-values. That position should however be
carefully interpreted. For example, although combining L4
with OTP2 would result in a marker in {H3,V3} (see Fig. 2),
an attacker capable of physically stealing the device to defeat
OTP2 will already be geographically co-located with the user,
and thus need not expend any additional effort to defeat L4.
Lack of schemes in top-right corner of Fig. 2. None of
the schemes analyzed have strong resistance to both mimicry
and exposure—see the three empty squares in the top-right
({H2,V3}, {H3,V2}, {H3,V3}). Schemes in this region would
strongly resist scalable attacks. This motivates combining
complementary schemes, as discussed immediately above.
Bands versus markers. Instead of marker representa-
tion, schemes on Fig. 2 could be represented using bands
(i.e., lines/curves or shaded areas). For example, passwords
could be represented by a vertical band from V1 (user-chosen
passwords) to somewhere in V2 (system-assigned passwords
that are resilient to guessing attacks, but still subject to
leaks). Such representation can help identify how different
implementations of a scheme may alter security. We chose the
simpler representation as it is easier to interpret, and to avoid
cluttering the chart with intersecting bands.
4 Comparative Evaluation
In Table 3, we evaluate selected classes of invisible and
mimicry-resistant authentication schemes (selected baseline
schemes are also included for comparison). We augment the
original 25 usability, deployability, and security properties
(benefits) of the UDS framework [1] with six new properties
relevant to schemes that are invisible and have mimicry-
resistance. These new properties were not present in the
original UDS paper. The original UDS properties (see Ap-
pendix A) and our new properties defined below are ital-
icized when referenced herein. The new properties are now
described:
U9. No-False-Rejects is a usability benefit concerning
authentication failures resulting from system error (e.g., due
to measurement error). False rejects arise due to fuzzy or
non-binary matching functions employed by some mimicry-
resistant and/or invisible authentication schemes, and are
thus relevant to penalize (by withholding this benefit) schemes
that suffer from false rejects (e.g., measurement-based In-
ternet geolocation methods). This differs from Infrequent-
Errors (U7, Appendix A), wherein authentication may fail
due to user action (e.g., incorrectly typing a password) or
attempts to authenticate under unusual circumstances (e.g.,
from unexpected locations).
U10. Easy-to-Change-Credentials is a usability ben-
efit for schemes where a user may easily change credentials
(e.g., in event of a server database leak). Intuitively, since
invisible schemes require no user action upon login or ac-
count set-up (see Section 2), these schemes rely on remotely
(cf. device-to-web) observing habitual user/device attributes
and/or behaviours, and transparently verifying these upon
login. Changing these credentials (regardless of the reason
for changing) is likely to impose user burden, i.e., changing
physical habits and/or habitual behaviors. This new property
(U10) allows appropriate penalization for such schemes. Note
that in contrast, Easy-Recovery-From-Loss (U8) reflects how
easily a user can recover from a credential loss (e.g., forgot-
ten password). Credential loss requires a fallback mechanism
to verify the user’s identity; changing credentials does not,
since the user remains in possession of valid credentials.
Easy-to-Change-Credentials is inherent to the authentication
mechanism itself, whereas Easy-Recovery-From-Loss may also
depend on the fallback mechanism.
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M1. No-False-Accepts is a mimicry-related (hence, the
‘M’ index) security benefit of schemes that have a sufficiently
large credential space and/or measurement precision such
that two different sets of credentials (e.g., iris scans from
two different individuals) are always distinguishable. False
accepts may include both non-malicious users and attackers
mistaken for legitimate users, e.g., due to close proximity in
a geolocation scheme, or a device fingerprint similar (within a
margin of error) to that of a legitimate user. Similarly to false
rejects, the fuzzy nature of many mimicry-resistant schemes
explored in Section 3 also introduces the possibility of false
accepts, justifying the importance of this new property (M1).
Note that false accepts exclude attacks on the integrity of the
authentication system (these are covered by other security
properties), such as manipulating delay measurements to
spoof a location or tampering with client-side code to spoof a
device fingerprint. For example, a location-based scheme lacks
this benefit if it is susceptible to colocation attacks, i.e., where
the attacker travels and colocates himself with the user in a
highly targeted attack.
M2. Resilient-to-Infrequent-Capture-or-Intercept
is a security benefit of schemes in which credentials are not
static, but change relatively slowly, e.g., personal knowledge
questions based on the user’s account activity, such as recent
transactions. Such non-static credentials, when compromised,
limit the duration for which the attacker retains account
access. Schemes with horizontal distance from the origin in
Fig. 2 (i.e., placed in H1, H2, or H3) offer this benefit; see
Section 3.1.2 for further discussion of schemes that satisfy this
benefit, under the heading H1.
M3. Verifies-Non-Static-Information is a security
benefit of challenge-response based schemes where the server
issues a new challenge per authentication; thus an attack that
simply captures and uses a static string should not succeed.
This benefit is offered by schemes where the server verifies a
client’s ability to generate a valid response to a challenge,
where the response is based on non-static information as
opposed to, e.g., a static secret. For example, Sound-Proof [62]
(see Section 3.3.5) verifies that the ambient sound (which is
non-static information) recorded by the user’s smartphone
matches the ambient sound recorded from the user’s access
device. OTP schemes may offer this benefit, if (1) the OTPs
are not generated based on a static client-stored seed (which
would be at risk of being captured by an attacker), and (2) the
OTPs expire either upon first use or within a short time frame
(e.g., 2 minutes), thereby substantially limiting the window
for successful replay. Schemes within H2 or H3 in Fig. 2 offer
this benefit; see Section 3.1.2 for further discussion of schemes
that satisfy this benefit, under the heading H2.
M4. Resilient-to-Spoofing is a security benefit of
schemes that leverage measurement techniques (e.g., hard-
ware or network-based) that are impractical for an attacker to
defeat at scale. For example, CPV [48] is Resilient-to-Spoofing,
since the measurements cannot be manipulated to make an
attacker appear to be in a different location (i.e., that of the
victim user). Only schemes in H3 of Fig. 2 offer this benefit;
see Section 3.1.2 for further discussion of schemes that satisfy
this benefit, under the heading H3.
Table 3 cells corresponding to benefits M2, M3, andM4 are
populated based on the analysis in Section 3.3 (and visualized
in Fig. 2). The following sections evaluate the schemes with
respect to the remaining benefits.
4.1 Impact of Account Recovery on Security
In practice, authentication schemes are paired with backup
mechanisms to help users recover account access if they lose
their credentials. The recovery mechanism should not be
easier to defeat than the primary scheme, but may sacrifice
usability since it is used less frequently.
For conventional password-based authentication, e-mail
based password reset is the standard recovery mechanism.
Its security relies on the implicit assumption that the user’s
e-mail account is at least as well-secured as any systems
that rely on it for password reset. It is ideally expected
that users choose a stronger password for primary e-mail
accounts; security-conscious users may also use two-factor
authentication. E-mail based recovery can also be used for
the geolocation and device fingerprinting schemes evaluated
herein; alternatives such as SMS-based OTP are also suitable.
For example, in a geolocation-based scheme, a user wishing
to login from a new location could be e-mailed a link through
which they could confirm their new location.
4.2 Evaluation of Stand-alone Schemes
Table 3 summarizes our evaluation of four main categories of
schemes: geolocation, device fingerprinting, OTPs and PUFs
as both stand-alone authentication schemes and in combina-
tion with passwords, based on the augmented UDS criteria
from Section 4. Password authentication is included as refer-
ence; OTP schemes are included as they are widely used in
combination with passwords. While additional schemes could
have been included, those selected were chosen as examples
to demonstrate the comparative framework. Each row in
the table corresponds to an authentication scheme, and each
column to a benefit; a cell with a bullet represents a benefit
offered by the scheme, an empty circle represents a benefit
partially provided, and an empty cell indicates that the benefit
is not provided.
4.2.1 Web Passwords
For the new properties, web passwords provide No-False-
Rejects since a correctly-typed password will never be re-
jected, Easy-to-Change-Credentials since passwords can be
easily changed, and No-False-Accepts since an exact match
is required. However, passwords lack Resilient-to-Infrequent-
Capture-or-Intercept, Verifies-Non-Static-Information and
Resilient-to-Spoofing, since it is trivial to replay a captured
password.
4.2.2 Location-based Schemes
Since L1-L4 in Table 3 are invisible to the user, they provide
most of the usability benefits. L3 (measurement-based) and
L4 (location verification) may sometimes take longer than
conventionally considered convenient, thus providing only a
partial Efficient-to-Use benefit. Additionally, all but L1 (GP-
S/WPS) may miscalculate the location and falsely reject users
in some cases, and therefore do not fulfillNo-False-Rejects. Al-
though L1 (GPS/WPS) may sometimes result in a small error
in location calculation, the calculated location will generally
remain in the same city, and thus gets a bullet. None of L1-
L4 are Easy-to-Change-Credentials, since changing credentials
would require the legitimate user to change their location.
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TABLE 3
Evaluation of geolocation, device fingerprinting, OTP, and PUF schemes as stand-alone authentication schemes and in combination with
passwords. Justification for inclusion: Password authentication is included as a baseline; OTP schemes are widely used in combination with
passwords; Sound-Proof [62] is a two-factor scheme that also provides some mimicry resistance. • denotes the scheme provides the corresponding
benefit (column); ◦ denotes partial benefit; an empty cell denotes absence of benefit. * denotes framework properties introduced herein.
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– P1: Web passwords (PW) • • • ◦ • • • • • • • • • ◦ • • • • •
G
eo
lo
ca
tio
n L1: GPS and WPS • • • • • • ◦ • • • • • • • • ◦ ◦ ◦
L2: IP-address based tabulation • • • • • • ◦ • • • • • • • ◦ • ◦
L3: Measurement-based • • • • • ◦ ◦ • • • • ◦ • • • ◦ • •
L4: Robust location verification • • • • • ◦ ◦ • • • • • • • ◦ • • •
D
ev
ic
e
FP
FP1: System parameters/prefs. • • • • • • • • • • • ◦ • ◦ ◦ • • ◦
FP2: Audio+Canvas Chal./Resp. • • • • • • • • • • • ◦ • ◦ ◦ • • ◦ • •
FP3: HW Sensors • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ◦
FP4: Clock skew • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • ◦ • • •
FP5: DNS Resolver • • • • • • • • • • • ◦ • ◦ ◦ • ◦ • ◦
FP6: Protocol-based • • • • • • • • • • • ◦ • ◦ ◦ • ◦ •
O
T
P
OTP1: OTP mobile app • • ◦ • • • • ◦ • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
OTP2: OTP USB token • • • • • • ◦ ◦ • • • • • • • • • • • • •
OTP3: SMS OTP • • ◦ • • ◦ • • ◦ • • • • ◦ • • • • • • • • ◦
OTP4: E-Mail OTP • • • • • • • • ◦ • • • • • • • • • • • • • ◦ • • ◦
P
U
Fs PUF1: Strong PUF • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
PUF2: Weak PUF • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
– Sound-Proof [62] • ◦ ◦ • • • • ◦ • • • • • ◦ • • • • • • ◦ • •
Combining passwords (PW) with secondary scheme
G
eo
.+
P
W L1: GPS and WPS • • • ◦ • • • • • • • ◦ • ◦ • ◦ •
L2: IP-address based tabulation • • • ◦ • • • • • • ◦ • • ◦ • • ◦
L3: Measurement-based • • ◦ ◦ • • • • ◦ • ◦ • • • ◦ • • •
L4: Robust location verification • • ◦ ◦ • • • • • ◦ • • • ◦ • • • •
D
ev
ic
e
FP
+
P
W FP1: System parameters/prefs. • • • ◦ • • • • ◦ • ◦ ◦ • • • • ◦ •
FP2: Audio+Canvas Chal./Resp. • • • ◦ • • • • ◦ • ◦ ◦ • • • • ◦ • • •
FP3: HW Sensors • • • ◦ • • • • • • • • • • ◦ •
FP4: Clock skew • • • ◦ • • • • • • • • • • ◦ • • • •
FP5: DNS Resolver • • • ◦ • • • • ◦ • ◦ ◦ • • • ◦ • • ◦
FP6: Protocols • • • ◦ • • • • ◦ • ◦ ◦ • • • ◦ • •
O
T
P
+
P
W OTP1: OTP mobile app ◦ • ◦ • • ◦ • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
OTP2: OTP USB token • ◦ • • ◦ ◦ • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
OTP3: SMS OTP ◦ • ◦ ◦ • • ◦ • • • • ◦ • • • • • • • • • ◦
OTP4: E-Mail OTP • • ◦ • • • ◦ • • • • • • • • • • • • • ◦ • • ◦
P
U
Fs PUF1 + PW • • ◦ • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
PUF2 + PW • • ◦ • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
– Sound-Proof + PW [62] ◦ • • ◦ ◦ • • • • • ◦ ◦ • • • • • • • • • • •
For deployability, all of L1-L4 are Accessible; they do not
require any explicit user action. They are Negligible-Cost-Per-
User, since the infrastructure expense is independent from the
number of users being served. They lack Server-Compatible as
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they require server-side changes, but are Browser-Compatible
(no client-side changes needed). L3 is partially Mature since
there are indications that it is being used in practice [63]; L4
is not Mature. Finally, Non-Proprietary variations for all of
L1-L4 are available.
L1-L4 are largely similar to each other in terms
of security properties offered, with the exception of
Replay-Resistance and Spoofing-Resistance. Due to the
small guessing space, L1-L4 are not Resilient-to-Throttled-
Guessing-Attempts and Resilient-to-Unthrottled-Guessing-
Attempts. Since location information must be stored
server-side, they are susceptible to the same expo-
sure threats as passwords, namely Resilient-to-Physical-
Observation, Resilient-To-Internal-Observation, Resilient-to-
Leaks-from-Other-Verifiers, and Resilient-to-Phishing. No-
Trusted-Third-Party is provided by L3-L4 if the website
runs their own geolocation infrastructure (e.g., deploys their
own verifier servers), but not by L2 (IP address tabulation)
which typically rely on a third-party service provider, and
partially by L1 since GPS does not require a third-party
service whereas WPS may. None of L1-L4 are fully No-False-
Accepts, since other users (both legitimate users and attack-
ers) could be residing near the legitimate user, and thus could
be indistinguishable to the server. They are not Resilient-to-
Targeted-Impersonation, since they are susceptible to targeted
colocation attacks. They are not Requiring-Explicit-Consent,
since they are invisible to the user—except for L1, since a
GPS/WPS location request may trigger a browser permission
prompt to the user, but if the user allows the browser to re-
member the preference, no future prompts are displayed. They
are all partially Unlinkable, since leaking server-stored user
location information may narrow the search space for linking
together multiple accounts across websites (the attacker may
still need to collect additional information).
4.2.3 Device fingerprinting
FP1-FP6 deliver most usability benefits, since they are invis-
ible to the user. However, as significant changes in the device
configuration (e.g., software or hardware upgrade) may sub-
stantially change a device fingerprint, they do not provide No-
False-Rejects. They are Easy-Recovery-from-Loss since e-mail
based recovery can be used, as with password authentication.
They are not Easy-to-Change-Credentials, since changing a
device fingerprint may require the user to obtain a different
device.
For deployability, device fingerprinting schemes are Acces-
sible, since they do not require any explicit user action. They
are Negligible-Cost-Per-User, since the cost of implementation
is essentially independent of the number of users. They are not
Server-Compatible, as server-side implementation is required,
but are Browser-Compatible. As device fingerprinting has
been used for anti-fraud applications [64], [65], but not widely
for user authentication, we consider FP1, FP2, FP5, and
FP6 partially Mature; FP3 and FP4 are not, as they have
been demonstrated academically but are not used in practice
to our knowledge. FP1-FP6 are generally available via Non-
Proprietary implementations.
Many of the security properties are shared across FP1-
FP6. They lack No-False-Accepts, since users that own iden-
tical devices (or share the same device) may be indis-
tinguishable from each other (and for techniques such as
clockskew, the overall credential space is not large enough
to rule out collisions). They lack Resilient-to-Unthrottled-
Guessing-Attempts, since none of the data collected thus
far to our knowledge indicates that the overall distribution
of device fingerprints would offer distinguishability of more
than about 30 bits [7], [18], [51], [66], [67], [68]. They lack
Resilient-to-Internal-Observation and Resilient-to-Phishing,
since an attacker may collect device information by running
their own device fingerprinting scripts via XSS attacks or
phishing websites.10 They lack Resilient-to-Leaks-from-Other-
Verifiers, since a user’s device fingerprint will be similar across
websites (varying only based on the particular fingerprinting
techniques that each website uses, and the method of storage
used), thereby leaking information that can be used to attack
users’ accounts on different websites. They are each individu-
ally partiallyUnlinkable since there may well be multiple users
with colliding device fingerprints—the likelihood of this may
diminish substantially when combining multiple techniques,
however. Requiring-Explicit-Consent is not provided, since
device fingerprinting is invisible to the user.
The remaining security properties differ across FP1-FP6,
as follows. FP3 and FP4 are Resilient-to-Physical-Observation
and Resilient-to-Targeted-Impersonation, since they rely on
device-specific manufacturing variations (even across devices
of the same model) and therefore can only be determined
via measurement; the remaining schemes only partially fulfill
these properties since an attacker that visually observes a
user’s device may obtain or mimic the same device model.
FP1 and FP2 have been shown to provide enough distinguish-
ing information to provide Resilient-to-Throttled-Guessing-
Attempts—to our knowledge the remainder have not, but may
collectively provide it if combined together [51].
4.2.4 OTP Schemes
For usability, OTP1-OTP4 are Memorywise-Effortless since
they do not require the user to memorize anything; they
are Scalable-for-Users since they allow the user to set up
multiple accounts without impacting usability. OTP4 (e-mail)
is Nothing-to-Carry, since the user just needs to be able to
access their e-mail account, whereas OTP1 (mobile app) and
OTP3 (SMS) are partially Nothing-to-Carry, assuming users
are typically in possession of their mobile phones at all times;
OTP2 (USB token) does not fulfill this property. All schemes
are Easy-to-Learn, but Inefficient-to-Use since they require
the user to type an extra code. They all provide Infrequent-
Errors since typos are much less likely with a short 6-digit
numerical code, and No-False-Rejects. OTP1 and OTP2 lack
Easy-Recovery-From-Loss since the secret is stored on the
device/token; OTP3 partially provides it since there is no
secret stored on the phone; OTP4 provides it, since a back-up
e-mail address can be used. They all offer No-False-Rejects,
since a valid OTP will not be rejected. Easy-to-Change-
Credentials is provided in full by all; a user that needs to
switch to a new OTP authenticator could, e.g., login with
their old authenticator, and then register the new one.
For deployability, all of OTP1-OTP4 are partially Acces-
sible, as blind users would require screen reading software to
read the OTP code. Only OTP1 and OTP4 are Negligible-
Cost-per-User, since SMS incurs a per-message cost to the
10. Collecting device information helps the attacker, but alone is
not enough to defeat mimicry-resistant schemes such as L4.
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server,11 and USB tokens have a per-user cost. All schemes
except for OTP2 (USB tokens) are Browser-Compatible; in
addition to requiring browser support (at this time, only
Google Chrome supports FIDO U2F), OTP2 tokens require
a hardware interface (e.g., USB-A, USB-C, NFC) that is
comaptible with the user’s devices—while a variety of hard-
ware tokens are available, they typically only possess one or
two interfaces. All of OTP1-OTP4 are Mature and with Non-
Proprietary implementations available.
For security, all of OTP1-OTP4 are No-False-Accepts,
Resilient-to-Physical-Observation, Resilient-to-Throttled-
Guessing, and Resilient-to-Unthrottled-Guessing. OTP1-
OTP2 and OTP4 are Resilient-to-Targeted-Impersonation,
but OTP3 only partially provides this benefit—attackers
may transfer the victim’s phone number to a new device
via a social engineering attack on the users’s mobile
operator [69]; the ease of conducting such an attack is
subject to the security measures put in place by the mobile
operator. They are Resilient-to-Leaks-from-Other-Verifiers
and Resilient-to-Phishing. Only OTP2 (USB tokens) is
Resilient-to-Internal-Observation—OTP1 is susceptible to
theft of the shared seed via malware, and OTP3/OTP4
are susceptible to malware- and network-based [27] capture
attacks.12 Only the e-mail mechanism (OTP4) is Resilient-
to-Physical-Theft. They all provide No-Trusted-Third-Party
and Requiring-Explicit-User-Consent. OTP1 and OTP2 are
Unlinkable since a unique key is used for each website; phone
numbers (OTP3) are linkable across sites; e-mail addresses
(OTP4) are partially Unlinkable, since users may freely create
different e-mail aliases.
4.2.5 PUFs
For usability, PUF1 and PUF2 lack Nothing-to-Carry and
Easy-Recovery-From-Loss, since they are tied to the device.
PUF1 is Easy-to-Change-Credentials since virtually endless
challenge/response pairs can be generated; PUF2 is not, since
the hardware needs replacement if subjected to a model-
building attack. All other usability properties are fulfilled,
since no user effort is required.
For deployability, PUF1 and PUF2 are not Negligible-
Cost-per-User, since hardware would need to be deployed
for each user, and they are not Server-Compatible, Browser-
Compatible, orMature. Non-Proprietary designs for PUF2 are
available [9], but not for PUF1 (to our knowledge).
For security, assuming a large enough space of challenge-
response pairs, PUF1 and PUF2 fulfill No-False-Accepts,
Resilient-to-Throttled-Guessing, and Resilient-to-Unthrottled-
Guessing. PUF1 provides Resilient-to-Internal-Observation
and Resilient-to-Phishing since challenge/response pairs can
be exposed without consequence; PUF2 does not provide the
former, since it is susceptible to model-building attacks, but
it provides the latter since it only responds to challenges
11. Bulk SMS rates can be on the order of a penny each (varying by
country). The total cost will vary based on whether the user base is
small or in the millions, and on average login frequency.
12. Since the UDS framework combines both network- and device-
based eavesdropping/interception into a single property (Resilient-
to-Internal-Observation), OTP1 and OTP3-OTP4 share the same y-
coordinate in Fig. 2, though OTP3 should be lower since it appears
to be susceptible to a larger subset of network-based interception
attacks [70].
originating from a verifier server. Both are Resilient-to-Leaks-
from-Other-Verifiers. PUF1 and PUF2 are neither Resilient-
to-Physical-Theft nor Requiring-Explicit-Consent. PUF1 has
No-Trusted-Third-Party and Unlinkable since every website
can store a separate set of challenge-response pairs, but PUF2
lacks these properties since it typically requires a single server
to verify challenge-response pairs (see Section 3.3.4).
4.2.6 Sound-Proof
For usability, Sound-Proof provides Memorywise-Effortless
since there is no secret for the user to memorize. It is partially
Scalable-for-Users, since only a single device is required, but
it appears that under the current architecture each service
requires a separate app. It partially provides Nothing-to-
Carry, since users with a smartphone will typically carry it
with them at all times. It is Easy-to-Learn, Efficient-to-Use,
and Infrequent-Errors as (aside from installing a smartphone
app at setup time) it does not require any user effort to use.
It partially provides No-False-Rejects and No-False-Accepts—
the false accept and false reject rates are tunable via a
threshold value, and the authors show that the intersection
between the two (the equal error rate) is about 0.02%. It lacks
Easy-Recovery-From-Loss, as the consequence of losing the
phone is similar to that of OTP1. For deployability, it lacks
Server-Compatible and Mature.
For security, Sound-Proof partially provides Resilient-
to-Physical-Observation, since being able to record sound
in the vicinity of the user can break the scheme (it also
lacks Resilient-to-Targeted-Impersonation, for this reason).
It is Resilient-to-Throttled-Guessing-Attempts and Resilient-
to-Unthrottled-Guessing-Attempts. It is not Resilient-to-
Internal-Observation or Resilient-to-Theft, since the scheme
can be broken by malware on the phone or by device theft.
It is Resilient-to-Leaks-From-Other-Verifiers (since there is
no static secret to be stored), Resilient-to-Phishing, and
No-Trusted-Third-Party. It is not Requiring-Explicit-Consent
since it requires no user action. It is Unlinkable, since different
services can use their own apps on the user’s smartphone.
5 Evaluation of Combined Schemes
The evaluation above naturally suggests that schemes offering
some degree of mimicry resistance may complement passwords
by adding a new security dimension; and invisible schemes
such as device fingerprinting and geolocation do so without
further burdening users. None of the latter (invisible) schemes,
however, seem suitable as a sole mechanism for user-to-web
authentication because either the invisibility aspect makes
them limited to device-to-web authentication (see Section 2),
or their security space is so small that they lack the ability to
uniquely identify users (e.g., suffer from false accepts). This
motivates exploring the resultant benefits when these schemes
are combined with passwords. This is also useful since some
password usability drawbacks might be ameliorated in the
medium to long-term by use of browser-based and/or stand-
alone password managers.
When combining two authentication schemes, both sets of
credentials should be correct for the user to gain access. This
then strengthens security. Ideally, the implementation should
limit any partial feedback, which might be beneficial to an
attacker using a divide-and-conquer strategy to independently
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defeat each scheme individually. When password authentica-
tion is combined with an invisible scheme, if the correct pass-
word is provided but the supporting invisible scheme fails, the
server can immediately fall back to a backup scheme such as e-
mail OTP. Otherwise, allowing retry authentication attempts
benefits attackers, but not legitimate users (except in cases
of system error where a retry might succeed, since invisible
credentials are not entered by the user). In the event of an
attack, this serves to notify the user that their password has
been compromised; otherwise, it gives the user an opportunity
to reset their supporting authentication mechanism (e.g., by
registering a new location or new device).
In Table 3, a combined authentication scheme as described
above only inherits the intersection of the usability and de-
ployability benefits, and the union of the security benefits—
except for No-Trusted-Third-Party and Unlinkable.
The bottom half of Table 3 evaluates the schemes from
the top half when used in combination with passwords.
The evaluation suggests that either geolocation or
device fingerprinting can be combined with passwords
to improve security properties, namely Resilient-to-
Physical-Observation, Resilient-to-Throttled-Guessing,
Resilient-to-Infrequent-Capture-or-Intercept, Verifies-Non-
Static-Information, and/or Resilient-to-Spoofing. To further
improve security, geolocation can be combined with one
or more device fingerprinting schemes. While combining
schemes, select those that maximize the resulting overall
benefits, e.g., combining L4 with FP2 and/or FP4. As a
downside, this would increase the probability of false rejects,
assuming the failure of any scheme causes authentication
failure. PUFs provide many security benefits, suggesting that
they could be sufficient as a sole authentication mechanism.
However, their major drawback is that they lack most
deployability benefits (in the web authentication context).
The usability drawbacks observed for the combined
schemes in Table 3 are in Efficient-to-Use for schemes that
introduce a perceptible delay in authenticating the user, No-
False-Rejects primarily due to variations in measurement or
fuzzy matching functions, and Easy-to-Change. The deploy-
ability drawbacks are in Server-Compatible and Mature, for
schemes that have not yet been widely used in practice.
6 Concluding Remarks
While it is not our main objective to provide
recommendations—rather the primary focus is in providing
the first in-depth treatment of the mimicry-resistance
dimension in web authentication schemes and taking
this dimension into account in a comparative evaluation
framework—we nonetheless give some guidelines which we
hope can help advance web authentication research. Our
evaluation shows that leveraging schemes with some degree
of mimicry-resistance is advantageous to security because
they could reduce attack scalability, and can achieve this with
minimal impact on usability if the scheme is also invisible. In
multi-factor authentication, combining highly usable schemes
often enhances the resultant (combined) benefits, even when
these offer relatively few security benefits individually since
security benefits are often additive (complementary). While
multi-factor authentication typically requires all factors to
pass in order to grant access, account recovery schemes
provide an alternative authentication path that attackers can
exploit to bypass the primary authentication mechanism.
Therefore, while combining multiple factors strengthens
security, the security level of any alternative attack path
(e.g., account recovery mechanisms) must be correspondingly
strengthened.
To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first to sys-
tematically investigate the mimicry-resistance aspect of user-
to-web and device-to-web authentication schemes. Segment-
ing the mimicry-resistance dimension into levels of replayabil-
ity and spoofability helps differentiate the ability of various
schemes to resist mimicry attacks. Evaluating schemes using
the new dimension, we found that most web authentication
schemes have limited to no mimicry resistance as they rely
fundamentally on the knowledge of some secret that (once
exposed) can be directly used by the attacker for account
break-in.
To incorporate mimicry-resistance into an evaluation
framework, we add mimicry-resistance properties and explore
how mimicry-resistance offers a second dimension orthogo-
nal to exposure-resistance. Plotting these dimensions (Fig.2)
gives a novel representation of attack scalability, where a
scheme’s ability to resist scalable attacks is conveyed by its
distance from the origin. The new framework thus allows
for a more comprehensive evaluation of web authentication
schemes by their ability to resist both exposure and mimicry,
and helps visualize relative resistance to attack scalability,
represented as a function of both components. Positioning
many representative web authentication schemes on the 2D
chart highlights that none explored to date occupy the top-
right corner (where schemes highly resistant to scalable at-
tacks would be place).
Using the new framework, we explore mechanisms that
offer mimicry-resistant web authentication, and find several
such schemes such as some variations of device fingerprint-
ing, several OTP-based schemes, robust Internet geolocation
methods, and certain variations of Physically Unclonable
Functions (PUFs). Our analysis highlights the degree to which
different schemes within the same family of schemes (e.g., dif-
ferent implementations of geolocation) can vary in mimicry-
resistance, and our evaluation framework facilitates scheme
selection (including from within a family) for maximizing
security benefits. For example, in Table 3, some geolocation
schemes (e.g., L4) are less susceptible to spoofing than others
(e.g., L1).
A challenging obstacle in reinforcing password authenti-
cation with additional schemes is doing so without deploy-
ability or usability penalties [2]. To evaluate the benefits of
combining these four approaches with passwords, we aug-
ment the UDS framework with new usability and security
properties to reflect mimicry resistance. Using the augmented
UDS framework (Table 3) to evaluate the resultant combined
schemes revealed that invisible techniques—those neither re-
quiring user involvement at set-up nor at login times such
as geolocation and device fingerprinting—offer substantial
usability advantages and have better deployability than PUFs
and OTP-based schemes.
Our work highlights the advantages of utilizing mimicry-
resistant techniques in web authentication, motivating further
exploration into invisible and mimicry-resistant techniques,
and providing directions on how to explore and evaluate the
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ability of schemes to resist scalable attacks.
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Appendix A
UDS Properties
The definitions of the UDS benefits (properties) can be found
in Bonneau et al. [1]. Here we list their labels and names
for reader convenience. They are grouped in three categories:
usabillity (U), deployability (D), and security (S).
U1 Memorywise-Effortless
U2 Scalable-for-Users
U3 Nothing-to-Carry
U4 Physically-Effortless
U5 Easy-to-Learn
U6 Efficient-to-Use
U7 Infrequent-Errors
U8 Easy-Recovery-from-Loss
D1 Accessible
D2 Negligible-Cost-per-User
D3 Server-Compatible
D4 Browser-Compatible
D5 Mature
D6 Non-Proprietary
S1 Resilient-to-Physical-Observation
S2 Resilient-to-Targeted-Impersonation
S3 Resilient-to-Throttled-Guessing
S4 Resilient-to-Unthrottled-Guessing
S5 Resilient-to-Internal-Observation
S6 Resilient-to-Leaks-from-Other-Verifiers
S7 Resilient-to-Phishing
S8 Resilient-to-Physical-Theft
S9 No-Trusted-Third-Party
S10 Requiring-Explicit-Consent
S11 Unlinkable
The new benefits introduced herein are listed below. The
mimicry-resistance (M) benefits are a new sub-category of
security benefits. For definitions of these new properties, see
Section 4.
U9 No-False-Rejects
U10 Easy-to-Change-Credentials
M1 No-False-Accepts
M2 Resilient-to-Infrequent-Capture-or-Intercept
M3 Verifies-Non-Static-Information
M4 Resilient-to-Spoofing
